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Abstract 
 
What was the contribution of intercontinental trade to the development of the European early modern 
economies? Previous attempts to answer this question have focused on static measures of the weight of trade in 
the aggregate economy at a given point in time, or on the comparison of the income of specific imperial nations 
just before and after the loss of their overseas empire. These static accounting approaches are inappropriate if 
dynamic and spillover effects are at work, as seems likely. In this paper I use a panel dataset of ten countries in a 
dynamic model which allows for spillover effects, multiple channels of causality, persistence and country-specific 
fixed effects. Using this dynamic model, simulations suggest that in the counterfactual absence of intercontinental 
trade, rates of early modern economic growth and urbanization would have been moderately to substantially 
lower. For the four main long-distance traders, by 1800 the real wage was, depending on the country, 6.1 to 
22.7% higher, and urbanization was 4.0 to 11.7 percentage points higher, than they would have otherwise been. 
For some countries, the effect was quite pronounced: in the Netherlands between 1600 and 1750, for instance, 
intercontinental trade was responsible for most of the observed increase in real wages and for a large share of the 
observed increase in urbanization. At the same time, countries which did not engage in long-distance trade would 
have had real wage increases in the order of 5.4 to 17.8% and urbanization increases of 2.2 to 3.2 percentage 
points, should they have done so at the same level as the four main traders. Intercontinental trade appears to have 
played an important role for all nations which engaged in it, with the exception of France. These conclusions 
stand in contrast with the earlier literature which uses a partial equilibrium and static accounting approach. 
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1. Introduction 
 
How important was intercontinental trade for the development of the European economies? This 
is a classic question in economic history, and one for which no consensus has been reached. The 
World-systems theory and the “dependency-theory” historiographical traditions argue that long-
distance trade mattered a lot because it allowed Europeans to accumulate large amounts of capital 
which jump-started its process of development (Marx 1990/1867, Wallerstein 1974, 1980, Frank 
1978, Williams 1994/1944).2 
 
By contrast, a revisionist literature considers that long-distance trade contributed only modestly 
at best, since, it argues, the external sector constituted a relatively small share of the early modern 
economies, and the quantities of capital accumulated as a direct consequence of trade were by no 
means sufficient to justify Europe’s advantage (O’Brien 1982, Mokyr 1985). It was further shown, 
using specific case studies, that the loss of empires had only trivial consequences for the European 
colonizers (O’Brien and Engerman 1991, O’Brien and Prados de la Escosura 1998). 
 
The revisionist literature made a useful contribution in the context of its time, as the importance 
of international trade had been clearly exaggerated by earlier neo-Marxist literature. But the 
revisionist literature is always based on a series of static comparisons, for instance relying on the 
Smith-Myint notion of “vent for surplus” (Myint 1977). However, as Findlay and O’Rourke (2007, 
p. 337) write, “comparative static models cannot, by definition, say anything about the impact of 
trade on growth”. The reason for this shift in thinking is that there may be indirect, dynamic 
general equilibrium, and spillover effect gains from trading. For instance, suppose an urban trade 
boom raises wages and then induces rapid development of labor-saving technological change. This 
growth-enhancing effect is completely absent from static calculations, which would incorrectly 
conclude that without trade, all else would be constant: GDP would only decrease by the amount 
of that trade. 
 
Another possibility is that long-distance trade may have indirectly promoted good institutions 
through a political economy effect: trade mattered indirectly, because of the additional wealth, and 
by consequence political power, that it brought to the merchant class (Braudel 1980, Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson 2005). Once again the key word here is “indirectly”; if indeed distributional 
issues in association with political economy were present, then a static calculation which simply 
wipes out trade and assumes all else is constant would completely miss out on this effect. Another 
likely channel is that of Romer (1993), which suggests that the transmission of new ideas may be 
an unsung source of gains from trade, a concept which seems to fit well with the narrative 
evidence for the early modern period. 
 
Did the revisionist literature go too far? Towards an answer, I estimate a dynamic model of the 
early modern European economy (following, but also improving, on Allen 2003, 2009). This is a 
dynamic model which takes into consideration a wealth of causal factors, in particular allowing for 
the endogeneity of urbanization and the real wage (among other variables). Additionally, it allows 
for macroeconomic persistence and (implicitly) general equilibrium effects. I estimate this model 
using Allen’s (updated) dataset, complemented with data for Portugal from Costa, Palma and Reis 
(2014). In order to control for the possibility of country-specific factors, such as “culture” or the 
way the empires were run (e.g. crown-sponsored empires vs. merchant companies), affecting the 
                                                            
2 See also Pomeranz (2000). 
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results I go a step beyond Allen and use more advanced estimation techniques which allow 
controlling for (time invariant) fixed effects (Arellano 2004). It is then possible to simulate 
alternative histories which allow for a new assessment of the dynamic economic growth and 
urbanization effects of intercontinental trade.  
 
I find that engaging in overseas trade allowed the mother economies in Europe to maintain real 
wages at levels which would not have been otherwise possible, and hence contributed to an early 
escape from a “Malthusian” stagnation steady state. Thanks to effects of intercontinental trade – 
and to a lesser extent, migration overseas, which created some slack in the land-labor ratios – by 
1800, the real wage was 6.2 (Spain) to 22.7 (Portugal) per cent higher in the main four long-
distance trade nations, while urbanization was 3.9 (Spain) to 11.7 (England) percentage points 
higher, than it would have been without that trade.3 At the same time, countries which did not 
engage in long-distance trade would have had real wages increases in the order of 5.4 (Italy) to 
17.8% (Germany) and urbanization increases of 2.2 (Germany) to 3.2 (Poland) percentage points 
by 1800, should they have had done so at the mean level of the four main long-distance traders. I 
hence complement the work of Allen (2009) for England, and that of Costa, Palma and Reis (2014) 
for Portugal, by showing detailed results on the counterfactual effect of shutting off 
intercontinental trade on the economic growth and urbanization rates of the additional eight 
European countries for which the data required for the exercise is available.4 
 
2. How should the contribution of intercontinental trade be measured? 
 
In the debate over the causes of the industrial revolution, at least from the late 1970’s to the early 
2000’s the dominant view in economic history was that the British Industrial Revolution had been 
a consequence of internal factors, and hence trade (or government policy) did not matter much. 
This position, most prominent in Thomas and McCloskey (1981), is summarized in Mokyr (1985, 
p.23), who after reviewing a series of static comparisons concludes that “the assertion that the 
British Empire was an important element in the Industrial Revolution is by now discredited”. 
 
And yet, as of late the pendulum has been swinging the other way. In sharp contrast with the 
revisionist position, but perhaps more in line with the traditional view of many historians, Findlay 
and O’Rourke (2007, p. 339) write that international trade was a key reason why the British 
Industrial Revolution was sustained and that “the success of the European Industrial Revolution is 
intimately connected with trade and overseas expansion” (p.364). In what may be interpreted as a 
sign of the times, Patrick O’Brien has changed his mind on the importance of the external sector 
(see for instance, O’Brien 2006), and even Joel Mokyr, while insisting other factors were more 
important, now presents a much more nuanced position (Mokyr 2009, p. 25-6, 145-6, 155-162). 
 
The motive underlying this shift is a sharper understanding of the critical need to use dynamic 
models in assessing outcomes under a no-trade counterfactual. While the revisionist literature is 
more historically cautious, quantitatively inclined and better informed in economic terms, it faces 
difficult identification problems. For instance, one approach is to compare the social rate of return 
from the investments made by the home country externally with the yield obtainable in the 
mother economy with the same stock of capital and controlling for the appropriate risk premium 
                                                            
3 Notice the difference in units: it is more convenient to express effects on urbanization in percentage point increases, 
since the original unit is itself already a percentage. 
4 I have used the most recent data available for the simulations in this paper. There are some small differences in the 
results relative to those reported in those papers due to the updating of the data. 
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(Thomas 1968). This approach has an important limitation: it implicitly assumes that if all of the 
capital which was invested in externally had been instead invested internally, the (marginal) rate 
of return for the latter would not have been different. In other words, it makes a “small economy” 
assumption on the rate of return, taken to be a constant. It is hard to believe this is credible, since 
it is likely that in equilibrium the rate would have been lower, as marginal investments at home 
would have only been available at diminishing returns, due to the existence of fixed factors 
complementary to capital, such as land, labor, or entrepreneurial capital. We can then see that 
assuming a fixed rate of return biases Thomas’s result against finding a large effect, since it 
appears as if the “opportunity cost” rate of return at home was higher than it in fact would have 
been under equilibrium. 
 
For the imperial economies, a related literature has attempted to recover the “empire effect” by 
comparing the national output of these economies before and after the loss of empire. For instance 
in the case of Spain, these static accounting methods lead to the conclusion that the loss of the 
greater part of the empire in the early nineteenth century led to a fall of between 3.0 to 8.4 per 
cent of GDP (Prados de la Escosura 1988, 1993). For Portugal, the equivalent number ranges 
from 3.4 to 8.0 per cent (Pedreira 1994). Similar magnitudes were found for Britain (Thomas and 
McCloskey 1981). Hence the conclusion has been, for all cases, that the loss of the empires did not 
matter much – and more generally, empire itself had probably never mattered that much. 
 
However, the loss of the empires is not a valid natural experiment. If colonial independence and, 
by implication, the substantial loss of colonial networks and property was at least in part 
anticipated by the entrepreneurs in Europe, then fewer investments will have been made in the 
last few years of the empire, invalidating the exercise. More generally, a static comparison of loss 
of GDP associated with the loss of the colonies is inappropriate if dynamic general equilibrium, 
macroeconomic persistence, and spillover effects are at work, as seems likely. The biggest 
opportunity cost from losing an empire was not likely to have been the one-time fall in GDP 
associated with the loss, but instead the lower rates of growth and structural change which 
resulted – especially outside of a political “free trade” context.  
 
The revisionist literature’s main points that the previous emphasis on capital accumulation as 
stressed by the Neo-Marxist literature was exaggerated, and that the capital gains from long-
distance trade alone cannot explain Europe’s economic performance over the long run, are likely 
to survive the test of time.5 At the same time, the identification problems discussed above suggest 
that the true importance of intercontinental trade in explaining the long term development of the 
European economies is still an open question. 
 
In fact, the counterfactual of “what would happen to a given economy without intercontinental 
trade” does not correspond to simply wiping out that trade while assuming all else would be 
constant. The answer provided by a ceteris paribus comparative statics exercise is not of primary 
interest to economic historians. Instead only a model which considers a dynamic equilibrium and 
allows for persistence as well as spillover effects can adequately model the effect of trade on 
growth. While no consensus has emerged over which model should be used to evaluate this effect, 
                                                            
5 To this I would add that the dependency theorists’ emphasis on the critical importance of capital accumulation is also 
difficult to square with the discovery of Solow (1957) that TFP change, not capital accumulation, is the main driver of 
economic growth – though of course, Solow’s data, as that of most of the growth accounting literature, refers to 
modern economies. See, however, Bond, Leblebicioglu and Schiantarelli (2010). 
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Allen’s (2003, 2009) model seems appropriate since it allows for macroeconomic persistence and, 
implicitly, spillover and general equilibrium effects. 
 
3. The model and estimation strategy 
 
Allen’s (2003, 2009) model can be used (and improved on) by following three steps. First, one 
defines the variables to be used and the identification assumptions which define the relationships 
between them, including which of these are to be considered endogenous, and which are to be 
treated as instrumental variables (IV’s). The usage of these sources of exogenous variation in the 
(otherwise) endogenous variable allows one to recover the effect of, for example, an increase in 
urbanization on the real wage. (It must be said at the outset that treating intercontinental trade as 
exogenous is a key maintained hypothesis here, as are the remaining exclusion restrictions which 
make up the Allen’s model.) Second, the parameters are estimated using the data, and alternative 
estimation methods can be considered. Finally, one takes the preferred choice of (point) estimated 
parameters, and solves the system so that simulations can be performed. Each of these steps shall 
be detailed in the following discussion. 
 
The underlying data is taken from Allen’s revised dataset and (in the case of Portugal) from Costa, 
Palma and Reis (2014). The amounts of per capita intercontinental trade are shown (in real terms) 
in figure 1. Then the impact of several covariates on four endogenous variables is estimated each 
period. The (skilled) real wage, the urbanization rate, the agricultural total factor productivity 
(TFP) and the share the proto-industrial labor share serve as the model’s endogenous variables, 
while the land-labor ratio, manufacturing TFP, share of land under enclosure, intercontinental 
trade and lagged urbanization are taken as exogenous. Ideally, using GDP per capita would be 
better than using the real wage, but due to lack of data availability for four of the countries in the 
sample, doing so would severely reduce the sample size and the power of the statistical tests. 
However, Costa, Palma and Reis (2014) show that for the countries for which GDP per capita is 
available, it is strongly correlated with the real wage, a relationship which is also significant at the 
standard levels. This result suggests using the real wage is an appropriate proxy.6 
 
FIGURE 1  
 
The model is estimated using a sample of ten European countries, each of which is observed at five 
benchmark periods: 1500, 1600, 1700, 1750 and 1800. The choice of countries and years has been 
based solely on data availability for the variables needed.7 The countries – defined under the 
“modern borders” of 1945 convention – are the nine countries in Allen’s original sample (England 
and Wales, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Poland, Austria/Hungary/Czechoslovakia, Spain, 
France, Belgium; Allen 2003, p. 405) plus Portugal. In the model, lagged urbanization serves as 
the “state variable”: it records all that needs to be known about the past at the beginning of each 
new period. Hence, persistence is allowed for since the same contemporaneous controls lead to 
                                                            
6 By using the real wage instead of GDP per capita, I am also biasing the results against finding an economically and 
statistically significant effect of intercontinental trade on GDP for two reasons: First, distributional issues suggest 
that if many of the gains from trade stayed concentrated in the hands of the merchant class, then the real wage index 
will be missing those effects; second, since the nominal wage underlying the construction of the real wage index is the 
day wage, if people worked more days stimulated by trade – as suggested by deVries (2008) and Hersh and Voth 
(2010) – then it will have been the case that the full effect of trade on GDP per capita will have been underestimated 
by using the real wage as a proxy. 
7 For instance, Denmark and Sweden did also engage in intercontinental trade as well but the required data for these 
countries is not available. 
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different combined effects on the dependent variables depending on how the economy evolved in 
the past. The model is linear by assumption and further identified by several exclusion restrictions 
which apply to the endogenous variables. 
 
The exclusion restrictions are as follows. First, the wage is assumed not to affect (directly) proto-
industry or urbanization, and proto-industry is assumed to only affect directly agricultural 
productivity. Second, urbanization is allowed to directly affect both the real wage and agricultural 
TFP, but not the proto-industrial labor share. Third, agricultural TFP can directly affect all three 
other endogenous variables. (Notice that indirectly, all variables are able to affect each other in the 
future via the current urbanization level, which will serve as a state variable in the next period.) 
Finally, the percentage of land under enclosure, the lag of the urbanization ratio, the level of 
intercontinental trade per capita (in constant prices of 1700), a dummy for the Spanish empire, a 
dummy for the British empire, the manufacturing sector TFP, and the price of energy and are 
used as instruments for the endogenous variables (the results are not sensitive to the most 
alternative choice of instruments defined by excluding some of the above.) 
 
I now show the results for two of the four endogenous variables.8 Table 1 focuses on the real 
wage. In column (1), it includes OLS estimates, which have only a statistical interpretation, but 
nonetheless show partial correlations which are of interest for comparative purposes. Column (2) 
replicates Allen’s 2SLS estimates. In column (3) I use a more modern estimation method which is 
appropriate for the data and problem at hand, the dynamic-panel Arellano-Bond estimator. This is 
a consistent GMM estimator for ‘short’ panels, which allows for unobserved panel-level effects 
potentially correlated with lagged dependent variables. (It allows for idiosyncratic heteroskedastic 
errors which are correlated within countries, but not across countries.)9 
 
TABLE 1 
 
Inspection of the results shows that the various estimated coefficients do not change much when 
alternative methods are used.10 The same is true for the urbanization equation estimates (table 2), 
and for the estimates for the other two variables taken to be endogenous (results not shown). 
 
TABLE 2 
 
The variables used for the estimation of the model are in natural logs, hence the coefficients can be 
interpreted as elasticities. (The only exception is the institutions dummy, which corresponds to a 
discrete effect.) For the present purpose the most relevant results are the point estimates which 
                                                            
8 I focus on reporting and interpreting the results for the real wage and on the urbanization rate. The results for the 
other two endogenous variables, the share of labor in proto-industry and the agricultural total factor productivity, are 
available upon request. 
9 The point of using this estimator is as follows. Since unobserved country-specific idiosyncrasies in the error term 
(eg. the micro details about how the empires or merchant networks of different countries were run) could be leading 
the pooled estimation methods to inconsistent parameter estimates, it may be possible to improve on the precision and 
credibility of the estimates by taking advantage of the panel data structure of the data. However, because lagged 
urbanization appears as an independent variable in some of the equations, the standard fixed effects estimator should 
not be used (Nickell 1981). One possibility would be to drop this variable, but since persistence plays a key role in the 
story, it is important to keep it. This problem can be solved using a dynamic panel-data estimator: this way we can 
allow for both persistence and (time-invariant) country-specific fixed effects. 
10 I also include an “IV robust F-statistic” row in each of the regression tables, and this shows the instruments are not 
weak, even under the most modern criteria (Stock and Yogo 2005). 
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indicate that a 10% increase in the land-labour ratio leads to a 4.4% increase in the real wage, and 
the same percentage increase in the urbanization rate leads to a 2.5% increase in the real wage. As 
for the second table, we can see that a 10% increase in intercontinental trade leads to a 1.2% 
increase in urbanization, and that a 10% increase in past urbanization leads to a 7.7% increase in 
current urbanization. (All of these results are statistically significant at the 10% or lower levels.)  
 
4. The effect of intercontinental trade on European economic growth and urbanization 
 
I am now at a position to simulate the impact of intercontinental trade on the dynamic evolution of 
these economies. To simulate the real wage and urbanization rate I solve the system, employing 
the estimated parameters and feeding in the historical data for the different explanatory variables. 
I then repeat the same procedure, but now imposing zero intercontinental trade. The difference 
between the two outcomes is the model’s simulated response to the impact on the home country’s 
economy of having engaged in intercontinental trade. Notice it is not a “static” or an “all else 
constant” answer, since the model’s endogenous variables are allowed to respond to changes in 
trade, both now and in the future (through the effect of lagged urbanization). 
 
Following this procedure it is hence possible to predict a (non-deterministic) path for the historical 
real wage and urbanization levels (as well as the other two endogenous variables), and these paths 
can be compared with the prediction for what would have happened under a counterfactual “no 
imperial trade” situation. Allen (2009, p. 125-6) does this for the well-known English case, a result 
I reproduce in figure 2. 
 
FIGURE 2 
 
Using this model it is possible to simulate the dynamic evolution of the real wage and urbanization 
rates for other early modern imperial economies as well (figures 3 and 4).11 It stands out that for 
four out of five of these economies, intercontinental trade played an important role in maintaining 
a high level of the real wage (largely by generating gains which arrested the tendency for decline 
which would have otherwise existed due to Malthusian population pressure), as well as increasing 
urbanization. These effects are small in the case of France, moderate in the case of Spain, and 
particularly large for England, the Netherlands, and Portugal.  
 
FIGURE 3 
 
FIGURE 4 
 
The cases of England and Portugal have been discussed extensively in, respectively, Allen (2009) 
and Costa, Palma, and Reis (2014), hence here I focus on the remaining cases – including the 
                                                            
11 Allen’s model of the early modern economy is not without disadvantages. The exclusion restrictions which identify 
the model, and hence make it estimable, are taken as maintained assumptions, which is unavoidable. (I did not perform 
tests of over-identifying restrictions, since the current consensus among econometric theorists is that these tests 
cannot be used to test for instrument validity; see for instance, Parente and Silva 2012.) A different criticism could be 
that even after controlling for the series of variables included, there may be something unobservable about some of the 
particular countries which would be driving the results. However, I also consider a number of robustness adjustments 
and alternative estimation methods, in particular, those specifically designed for panel data and which account for 
fixed-effects. Further, I address the possibility of – potentially time-variant – “unobservable” idiosyncratic effects in 
detail in the appendix. In any case, the safest way to think about the results is that they are conditional on Allen’s 
model for the European early modern economy, the key assumptions of which are maintained throughout the analysis. 
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estimated counterfactual effects for those which did not engage in oceanic trade at all, such as 
Poland. In the case of the Netherlands, it is noteworthy that these simulations suggest that much 
of the real wage and urbanization gains during the “golden age” (here, 1600-1750) were 
attributable to intercontinental trade. In this period, the real wage became 7.4% higher than it 
would have otherwise been, and urbanization 7.4 percentage points higher. (Notice the change in 
units: urbanization effects are measured in percentage points, not percent.) 
 
Even in the case of Spain, where, due to relatively small amounts of per capita intercontinental 
trade, the effects were not as large as elsewhere, they were nonetheless non-negligible: a real wage 
of about 7.5 instead of 7 in 1800, and growing levels of urbanization (instead of declining, under 
the no-trade scenario).12 The only exception of a country for which no important effects may be 
said to have been attributable to intercontinental trade was France, an unsurprising outcome in 
light of the fact that, as shown in figure 1, France had a very little intercontinental trade in per 
capita terms. In table 3, I show the proportion in which real wages grew, at different points in 
time, as a consequence of engaging in intercontinental trade. Further, in parenthesis, I show the 
percentage point effect on urbanization. 
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
It is possible to follow up on this line of thought by considering a further series of counterfactual 
experiments for the countries which did not engage in intercontinental trade (table 4). The 
simulations suggest, for instance, that if Poland had access to a per capita level of trade similar to 
that of the average of the four main European long-distance trading nations (i.e. France excluded), 
then it would have arrested about half of its observed decline in real wages – its real wage would 
have been, by 1800, 12.1% higher than was the case, and its urbanization 3.4 percentage points 
higher.13  
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
The real wage effects are particularly large for Poland, but are nonetheless far from negligible for 
the others. Had Italy, Germany, or Austria/Hungary/Czechoslovakia engaged in intercontinental 
trade at the average level of the four main “Atlantic traders”, they would have realized real wage 
gains from 5.4 (Italy) to 7.7% (Austria) and an urbanization bonus of 2.2 (Germany) to 3.1. (Italy) 
percentage points. Of course, whether it would have been feasible for these countries to engage in 
these volumes of intercontinental trade in direct competition with the long-distance trading 
nations that did is a relevant question. But the goal here is not to actually suggest that for these 
countries engaging in intercontinental trade would have been a historically realistic possibility: as 
always, historical extrapolations need to be handled with great care. Instead, the point is that this 
exercise may give us some perspective on what the likely contribution of long-distance trade for 
the nations that did engage in it may have been.14  
                                                            
12 Notice, then, that it seems the estimates of Prados de la Escosura (1988, 1993) for Spain have turned out to be closer 
to the mark than those of Lains (1991) or Pedreira (1994) for Portugal, as well as those of Thomas and McCloskey 
(1981) for Britain. 
13 Further results (not shown) suggest that if instead it had access to per capita levels of trade equivalent to those of 
Portugal, it would have arrested most of its decline, and in fact it would have even growth a little from 1700 onwards. 
14 I do not include Belgium in the table due to this country’s unusually large residual: the model’s prediction for the 
historical case (which we can compare with the data), is somewhat worse than for the other countries; see the appendix 
for further details and a formal justification. I emphasize that by doing so I am biasing the results against the thesis 
that intercontinental trade mattered, as the simulated effect for Belgium is even larger than that of Poland. 
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5. Sailing away from Malthus 
 
It is possible to attain better intuition of the importance of intercontinental trade for each country 
by considering its effects side by side with those of observed increases in population. For each 
economy, increases in population – and hence decreases of the land-labor ratio – meant, with all 
else constant, diminishing returns to agricultural production and lower levels of income. The early 
modern expansion of the population is the most likely culprit for the observed overall decline in 
real wages. 
 
Keeping this in mind, I now consider a series of experiments designed to evaluate the contribution 
of intercontinental trade in arresting the decline in real wages and in promoting increases in 
urbanization, when compared with the simulated gains from keeping population (counterfactually) 
constant after 1600. The choice of this date is arbitrary and simply based on the observation that 
under the five possible choices of a benchmark, 1500 would have been “too early” to consider this 
experiment since most countries did not have non-negligible levels of trade then. (Further, as is 
well-known European population levels had not yet fully recovered from the shock of the Black 
Death and subsequent plagues.) At the same time, 1700 is too late to consider this exercise, so 
1600 seems on the whole the appropriate choice. 
 
I start with the effect on the real wage (figure 5), and then proceed to the urbanization rate (figure 
6).15 For each country the solid line shows the simulated historical path, as in figures 2 and 3. 
Then the broken line in which benchmarks are marked with a triangle marker shows the predicted 
path with population constant after 1600. As expected, the result is that for all the countries the 
real wage shoots up after that date, and the magnitude of the effects on urbanization is large as 
well. 
 
FIGURE 5 
 
FIGURE 6 
 
But the most important comparative insight can be achieved – in addition to keeping population 
constant after 1600 – by also shutting off intercontinental trade (the result is shown under the 
broken line with round markers). Now the previous results gain some comparative perspective. 
For some countries such as Portugal in 1700 and even Spain as late as 1750, the returns from the 
empire led to gains in the real wage which were equivalent or even above those of keeping 
population henceforth always constant at the 1600 level. Hence for these countries, the overseas 
empires generated returns for the mother economies which cancelled much of the tendency 
towards decline in real wages which would have naturally occurred as a result of population 
expansion, maintaining wages at relatively high levels which would not have been possible 
without a (historically unlikely) negative demographic response, and sometimes even generating 
per capita economic growth.16 In addition, colonies and merchant companies allowed for migration 
                                                            
15 Two notes about figures 5 and 6 are in order. First, I do not show France since as discussed before its low level of 
per capita trade could only trivially lead to small effects. Instead, I show England in these graphs. Second, the scale in 
the vertical axis for the Netherlands in figure 6 and for England in both figures is extended. 
16 Further results (not shown) suggest that for the countries which did not engage in intercontinental trade, having 
done so at the average level of the “big four” would have been able to cancel much of the real wage losses associated 
with their own post-1600 population growth. 
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opportunities to different lands. These population outflows created some slack in the land-labor 
ratios of the countries for which trade opportunities were available, further allowing for a 
persistent deviation from convergence to a Malthusian stagnation steady state. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Faced with Malthusian pressure, economies look for ways out. For a given initial combination of 
preferences, technology, endowments, and institutions, an escape may or may not be available. But 
it must be recognized that, unlike what may be suggested by the real wage data of Allen (2001) or 
Clark (2005) – and in particular, in contrast with what has been forcefully claimed by Clark (2007) 
– many early modern European economies did experience extended periods of intensive growth.17  
 
Indeed, while the long-term behaviour of the skilled real wage may suggest, for most countries, 
either stagnation or – depending on how early one starts the analysis – even decline, one must 
remember that this is an imperfect measure of growth.18 Indeed, several factors which were behind 
early modern intercontinental trade-driven economic growth will be missed if one looks at the real 
wage only. First, distribution effects may have been important: perhaps merchant groups captured 
the bulk of the gains, and this did not fully trickle down. Second, any capital gains will be missed. 
Third, effects on productivity change will be missed.  
 
Finally, there is the important possibility of an increase in the number of working hours, and in 
particular, working days. The nominal wage underlying the construction of real wage data is the 
day wage. Hence the real wage data of Allen (2001, 2003) and Clark (2007), which is based on a 
maintained assumption of a fixed number of days (250 in the case of Allen), will almost surely 
underestimate actual growth, since the new consensus is that Europe underwent an “industrious 
revolution” of an increase in the number of working days per year (Voth 2001, de Vries 2008) and 
it has been now further shown that this increase was not restricted to Northwestern Europe (e.g. 
Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 2013, Palma and Reis 2014). For this reason, all of these 
economies grew in intensive (as well as extensive) terms. 
 
For those economies, income growth was simply faster than the demographic response. For sure, 
the premodern economies that did grow did so at rates which were slower than those of modern 
economic growth and the sources of growth tended to be more Smithian (due to increased 
specialization and market integration) than Schumpeterian (technical change) in nature but always 
included some of the latter as well.19 Clearly, the existence of some intensive growth was not a 
sufficient condition for a definite take-off. But the fact that much of early modern Europe was – 
taking the period as whole – one such case, is an important background to understanding the 
timing and location of the emergence of modern economic growth. 
 
                                                            
17 Despite stagnated or declining real wages, during the early modern period there was per capita GDP growth in 
Britain (Broadberry et al 2011), Holland (van Zanden and van Leeuwen 2012), and Portugal (Palma and Reis 2014), 
though usually the growth was not consistent; for Spain the evidence is more mixed (Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la 
Escosura 2013), and in the case of North and Central Italy most of the period is one of decline (Malanima 2011). 
18 For a convenient summary of the differences and a variance decomposition exercise for the case of England, see 
Angeles (2008). 
19 One classic case is Sung China (Jones 1988), and usually the intensive growth was also accompanied by population 
growth and hence some extensive growth as well (Goldstone 2002), but the fact remains that income per person, and 
not just population density, increased during long periods of time. 
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What is certain is that the European regions which engaged in larger amounts of intercontinental 
trade tended to either grow more or declined less, especially in relative terms when compared with 
what the overall European trend was at a given period. Although based on this fact alone – and 
even after “controlling” for several covariates – it is difficult to attribute straightforwardly any 
direction of causation, the most historically plausible scenario seems to be that during the early 
modern period the nations which were able to explore their technological, geographic and 
institutional conditions in order to build and maintain empires or other long-distance merchant 
networks benefited a great deal from them: not due to the direct effect of capital accumulation, but 
to the technological, organizational, and institutional spillovers that this trade generated.20 
 
Indeed, for the early modern imperial European economies, intercontinental trade organized along 
mercantilist strategic orientations was a key opportunity. It provided access to new and exciting 
goods from Asia and America which were under inelastic supply in Europe, and promoted the 
development of national manufacturing industries. Spillover effects resulting from intercontinental 
trade led to changes in urbanization and regional specialization, but they cannot be measured by 
static accounting methods (Findlay and O’Rourke 2007).21 I have suggested an alternative way to 
measure them, using a dynamic model which allows for macroeconomic persistence and indirect, 
general equilibrium effects. 
 
The resulting simulations which result from a series of no-trade counterfactual exercises suggest 
that the early modern European imperial economies would have experienced a drop in incomes in 
the absence of intercontinental trade. The existence of these empires meant that unlike other parts 
of Europe they at the very least able to sustain comparatively high levels of wages, when 
contrasted in the Asian mirror (Broadberry and Gupta 2006). The quantification presented here is 
certainly not the only one possible, and because it is not built on specific “microfoundations” it 
needs to be interpreted as reduced form evidence. At the same time, while it does not seem 
possible at this moment to construct a credible structural model that captures the full extent of the 
dynamic effects of intercontinental trade, these simulations do suggest that the broad orders of 
magnitude of the real wage and urbanization attributable to intercontinental trade are likely to 
have been high.22 And as is well-known in the finance and macroeconomics literature, reduced-
form models often have better predicting capabilities than attempts at structural modelling, even 
when it is not possible to posit causal relationships in a rigorous sense.  
 
To be sure, one major limitation here is that the reasons why some countries failed to engage in 
intercontinental trade despite the large apparent advantages from doing so have not been 
                                                            
20 One additional possibility which has not been considered here is that countries which engaged in natural resource-
intensive extraction operations, namely Spain and Portugal, may have suffered Dutch disease or institutional resource 
curse as a consequence.  
21 In fact, even the methods I have used in this paper are likely to underestimate the complete beneficial effects of the 
intercontinental trade because with it also came new technologies, products, and ideas, which contributed to pan-
European growth and urbanization (see for instance, Nunn and Qian 2011). Since all the countries in the sample used 
here are in Europe, any European-wide spillover effects indirectly caused by the maintenance of empires and merchant 
networks by some of the countries will be, by definition, absent, since the countries treated as “controls” would have 
been also been affected, and hence “contaminated”. Under the assumption – which certainly holds in-sample – that the 
empires had a positive effect on incomes, the existence of such an effect suggests that empires would have had an even 
stronger effect than that estimated. Additionally, the discovery of the New World may have also contributed to 
“opening the people’s minds”, hence contributing to faster scientific and technical change. 
22 By lumping the value of precious metals together with other types of commodities, this analysis also does not allow 
for the possibility of Dutch disease or institutional resource curse. 
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explored. In some cases such as Poland, Austria, and Germany, it is possible to justify the lack of 
participation due to landlocked geographical conditions, but the explanation holds less power for 
Italy. A related point is that it is important to understand the differing degrees of participation 
intensity for the countries which did engage in this trade – why did France, for instance, engage 
much less than the “main four”? In light of the fact that these benefits seem to have been 
substantial, the mechanism of self-selection into engagement with, and intensity of, long-distance 
trade, remains as a fruitful avenue for future quantitative research.23 
 
In sum, while Malthusian forces were certainly present, early modern Europe was not stuck at a 
low-income stagnation steady state (Mokyr and Voth 2009). While population pressure certainly 
existed, it was not everywhere sufficient to cancel the net effect of increased hours, specialization, 
market integration, and as time went on, the returns from intercontinental trade, which interacted 
with all those factors and further accrued to an increasing number of countries as time went by. 
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Tables and figures 
 
 
Table 1. The real wage equation. Standard errors are robust and small sample adjusted. In specification (3) 
the endogenous variables LNAGTFP and LNURB are instrumented by Allen’s seven instruments and two 
exogenous variables (Allen 2009). All logs are natural logs. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10, 5, and 1% levels. Sources: see text. 
 
 
Table 2. The urbanization equation. Standard errors are robust and small sample adjusted. In specification 
(3) the endogenous variable LNAGTFP is instrumented by Allen’s seven instruments and two exogenous 
variables (Allen 2009). All logs are natural logs. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1% levels. Sources:  see text. 
Dependent variable: Log of the real wage (1) 
 
(2) (3) 
 
Estimator 
 
OLS 
 
2SLS 
Arellano-Bond 
dynamic panel 
GMM 
Log of the land labor ratio .477*** 
(.066) 
.444*** 
(.099) 
.444*** 
(.098) 
Log of the urbanization ratio .170** 
(.076 ) 
.250*** 
(.077) 
.250*** 
(.083) 
Log of the agricultural total factor productivity .924*** 
(.161) 
.675** 
(.324) 
.675** 
(.305) 
Institutions dummy .119 
(.077) 
.059 
( .120) 
.0593 
(.099) 
Intercept 1.77*** 
(.176) 
2.024*** 
(.270) 
2.024*** 
(.278) 
IV first stage 
F-statistic 
- LNAGTFP: 23.73 
LNURB:  68.77 
- 
R2 .6494 . 6270 - 
observations 50 50 50 
 
Dependent variable: Log of the urbanization ratio 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Estimator 
 
OLS 
 
2SLS 
Arellano-Bond 
dynamic panel 
GMM 
Log of intercontinental trade per capita .123** 
(.060) 
.123** 
(.059) 
.123* 
(.070) 
Log of the lagged urbanization ratio .8221105*** 
(.067) 
.7664851*** 
(.079) 
.7664851*** 
(.080) 
Log of the agricultural total factor productivity  
.221 
(.144) 
 
.446* 
(.259) 
 
 
.446* 
(.241) 
Institutions dummy .022 
(.096) 
.071 
(.108) 
.071 
(.090) 
Intercept -.392 
(.181) 
-.567** 
(.239) 
-.567** 
(.231) 
IV first stage 
F-statistic 
- LNURB: 23.73 - 
R2 .8705 .8653 - 
observations 50 50 50 
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 England Netherlands Spain France Portugal 
1500 0 (0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
1.0 
(0.3) 
1600 0 (0) 
0 
(0) 
1.1 
(0.7) 
0 
(0) 
2.9 
(0.9) 
1700 2.3 (1.0) 
3.7 
(3.4) 
2.5 
(1.6) 
0.3 
(0.1) 
5.7 
(2.0) 
1750 5.4 (2.5) 
7.3 
(7.1) 
4.3 
(2.8) 
1.1 
(0.4) 
17.0 
(7.1) 
1800 18.4 (11.7) 
6.1 
(6.2) 
6.2 
(3.9) 
0.9 
(0.4) 
22.8 
(10.8) 
 
Table 3.  Real wage increase (per cent) attributable to the effect of intercontinental trade, 1500-
1800. (In parenthesis, increase in urbanization percentage points attributable to the effect of 
intercontinental trade.) 
 
 
 
 Poland Italy Germany Austria 
1500 0.2 (0.0) 
0.1 
(0.1) 
0.1 
(0.0) 
0.1 
(0.0) 
1600 1.0 (0.2) 
0.4 
(0.2) 
0.4 
(0.1) 
0.6 
(0.1) 
1700 3.4 (0.8) 
1.5 
(0.8) 
1.5 
(0.6) 
2.2 
(0.6) 
1750 7.4 (1.8) 
3.2 
(1.8) 
3.2 
(1.3) 
4.8 
(1.4) 
1800 12.1 (3.4) 
5.4 
(3.1) 
5.0 
(2.2) 
7.7 
(2.6) 
 
Table 4.  Real wage increase (per cent) attributable to the effect of (counterfactually) increasing 
intercontinental trade to the average level of the four main European trading nations, 1500-1800, 
for the countries which did not engage in intercontinental trade. (In parenthesis, percentage points 
increase in urbanization) 
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Fig 1. Intercontinental trade per capita, 1500-1800. The 1800 trade values for France 
correspond to 1788 and those of the Netherlands to 1780. Sources: for Portugal, Costa, 
Palma and Reis (2014); for France (1788), data kindly supplied by Guillaume Daudin 
and converted at the exchange rate of 1/25th of a pound sterling per livre tournois; for 
the Netherlands (1780), van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012), converted at the 
exchange rate of 10.5 guilders per pound sterling. For all other data, see Allen (2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2. Simulated real wages and urbanization for England under the historical and no-
trade counterfactual scenarios (as in Allen 2009). 
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Figure 3. Simulated real wages under the historical and no-trade counterfactual scenarios (Spain, 
Portugal, the Netherlands, and France). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Simulated urbanization rates under the historical and no-trade counterfactual scenarios 
(Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and France). 
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Figure 5. Simulated real wages under the historical, the “population constant after 1600”, and the 
“no-intercontinental trade together with population constant after 1600” scenarios (Spain, 
Portugal, the Netherlands, and England). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Simulated urbanization rates under the historical, the “population constant after 1600”, 
and the “no-intercontinental trade together with population constant after 1600” scenarios (Spain, 
Portugal, the Netherlands, and England). 
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Appendix 
In this appendix, I provide some further discussion about a technical matter related to the model’s 
simulations. In particular, I discuss the difference between the model’s prediction for the historical 
situtation in a given country at a given period, versus the observed values (the residual).24 It is 
possible to calculate the average of the absolute number of the five residuals for each country.25 I 
now show that – with the possible exception of Belgium, due to its exceptionally high initial levels 
of urbanization – there are no systematic biases to the (absolute value of the average) residual for 
any given country (figure A1).26 This suggests that the fit for all countries is roughtly similar and 
is suggestive that for any particular country the results are not being driven by unobserved 
specificities.  
 
Figure A1. The average of the absolute value of the residuals (in real wage units) for all the countries in the 
sample.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
24 For each country and each benchmark year, it is possible to calculate the residual, defined as the difference between 
the simulated and the historical wage. (The simulated wage is simply the model’s prediction for the real wage under 
the observed values for the exogenous variables). 
25 Absolute values were used for each benchmark period in the interest of values of opposing signs at different times 
not cancelling up. 
26 As with the data of figure 1 from the main text, the value of (inflation-adjusted) intercontinental trade used here for 
the Netherlands and France are those of 1780 (the Netherlands), and 1788 (France), respectively the last year of 
“normal” trade volumes; using zero instead leads to very similar results since only the terminal real wage – that of 
1800 – is affected. 
